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(previously Dr N Durrant)* 
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Abstract 
As part of the Australian Government’s Clean Energy Plan, the Government has attempted to harness 
the legal innovation of the tradeable emissions unit, within a capped carbon trading system, to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Such an approach promises to send a price signal to the market which will 
influence emitting behaviours and reduce our emissions in a cost-effective manner. However, if the 
carbon trading scheme is to successfully achieve cost-effective emissions reductions then the carbon 
market must be supported by an appropriate legal framework.  This paper will consider the key 
features of the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism, including the Carbon Farming Initiative, and 
critique whether it has all the hallmarks of an effective legal framework to reduce Australia’s net 
greenhouse gas emissions. The likely future of the trading scheme, following the 2013 elections, will 
also be addressed. 
 
1. The Australian Carbon Pricing Story 
Australia has had a rocky road in designing its emissions trading system. Many models have been 
proposed. However, up until recently those proposals have failed to win passage through the Australian 
Senate.1 Australia’s political landscape changed dramatically in 2010 with an election that resulted in a 
hung Parliament. A significant shift in support towards the Australian Greens party left the Greens in the 
position of sharing the balance of power in the House of Representatives with a number of independent 
MPs and holding the balance of power in the Senate. In order to form a minority government, Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard and the Australian Labor party entered into a series of agreements with the Greens 
party MPs and a number of independent MPs. This included an undertaking to establish the Multi-Party 
Climate Change Committee, comprised of Labor, Greens and Independent MPs, to explore options for 
implementing a carbon price in Australia. The committee was established in September 2010 and started 
from the position that a carbon price was a necessary economic reform required to reduce Australia’s 
carbon pollution.2 Members of the Australian Coalition party were invited to sit on this committee but 
declined owing to the conflicting position of their party on the need to price carbon. Their position is that 
similar levels of emissions reductions can be achieved through “direct” regulatory action rather than 
relying on the use of taxes or other economic instruments.3  In July 2011, the committee released the 
Multi-Party Climate Change Committee Clean Energy Agreement setting out the agreed framework for 
putting a price on carbon. This included agreement to the introduction of a “fixed price” for carbon 
                                                            
* (nee Durrant) Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia. The 
author acknowledges receipt of funding from the Australian Research Council, Discovery Project 1094061 “An 
integrated legal regime for a sustainable carbon cycle.” 
1 Legislation for the implementation of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, an emissions trading scheme, was 
developed in 2008-2009 by the Rudd Labor Government. However, the bills package was rejected by the Australian 
Senate twice in 2009. A third attempt to achieve passage of the bills package in May 2010 was abandoned prior to 
the Senate voting on the bills package owing to very vocal opposition from both the Coalition and the Greens Party. 
See Durrant N “Australia’s Legal Response to Climate Change: business as usual or legal innovation?” 22 (3) 
Environmental Law and Management Journal (2010) pp 105-114. 
2 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, “About the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee” 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/mpccc/about-mpccc.aspx> viewed 10 January 2012.  
3 The Australian Coalition, ‘Direct Action Plan on the Environment and Climate Change’ 2010. 
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permits prior to the market transitioning to a fully flexible trading system.4 This has, unfortunately led to 
the Australian scheme being commonly referred to as a “carbon tax”, causing serious political headaches 
for the Prime Minister who went to the 2010 election promising there would be no carbon tax under a 
Gillard Government (“the Government”).5  
Following the agreement of the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee, the Australian Government 
released the details of its Clean Energy Plan.  This included the Australian Government’s policy 
commitment to reduce national carbon emissions to 5 per cent below 2000 levels by 2020 and 80 per cent 
below 2000 levels by 2050.6  The Government’s principal measure for addressing emissions involved the 
imposition of a price on carbon, in conjunction with a trading mechanism, known as the Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism.7 The legislative package for the implementation of the Carbon Pricing framework was 
passed in November 2011. The Government also secured passage of legislation to establish an incentive 
scheme for landholders for the creation and trade of land based carbon offset credits, known as the 
Carbon Farming Initiative.8 The Government’s Clean Energy Plan includes a number of additional 
measures including adjustments to fuel tax credits and excise, at such a rate as to have the same effect as 
directly applying a carbon price.9 The Government will also establish the Clean Energy Finance 
Corporation, supported by AU$10 billion in funding, to carry out investment in renewable energy, low-
pollution and energy efficiency technologies.10 In addition, the new Australian Renewable Energy Agency 
(ARENA) will administer AU$3.2 billion in support for research and development, demonstration and 
commercialisation of renewable energy over a nine year period.11  Despite being called the “Clean Energy 
Plan”, the plan is silent on additional regulatory measures to promote renewable energy and energy 
efficiency within Australia, relying instead on the continuation of the existing Renewable Energy Target 
Scheme and the implementation of the National Strategy on Energy Efficiency.12 
2. International Drivers behind Australia’s Legal Response 
The domestic response to climate change in Australia is part of a much bigger international endeavour to 
reduce global atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions.  This means that our successes 
and failures at a domestic level will affect the ultimate outcomes of the international community in 
reducing global levels of greenhouse gases.  The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) was signed and ratified by Australia in 1992.13 It acknowledged that anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases were contributing to adverse climate change and adopted the goal of 
achieving the stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.14 The Copenhagen Accord, 
                                                            
4 This had been previously called for by the Australian Greens Party as a solution to the deadlock surrounding the 
failed Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme. The Australian Greens MPs, ‘Greens Propose Garnaut’s Interim 
Solution to Break CPRS Deadlock’ and ‘Interim Carbon Price: Proposal for a Transitional Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism’ (January 2010) <http://greensmp.org.au> accessed 20 December 2011. 
5 Gillard Julia, "There will be no carbon tax under the government I lead" August 16, 2010 < 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-06-24/julia-gillards-year-in-quotes/2769610> viewed 10 January 2012. 
6 Australian Government, Securing a Clean Energy Future: The Australian Government’s Climate Change Plan, 
(2011),  Chapter Two-Targets for Action,  <http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/Consolidated-Final.pdf> viewed 10 January 2012. [hereinafter “Clean Energy Plan”]. 
7 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth),  [hereinafter “Clean Energy Act”].  
8 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) [hereinafter “CFI Act”]. 
9 This will not apply to domestic fuel users and fuel use associated with agricultural, forestry and fishery activities, 
Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 29. 
10 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 63. 
11 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 63; Australian Renewable Energy Agency Act 2011(Cth). 
12 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p ix. For a discussion of these mechanisms see Durrant, n1. 
13 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature on 4 June 1992, 31 ILM 849 
(entered into force on 21 March 1994) [hereinafter “the UNFCCC”]. 
14 UNFCCC, “Decision 1/CMP. 15: Copenhagen Accord”(CMP.15, 18 December 2009). 
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although not an official legal agreement, indicated that to achieve this, the global community should 
reduce concentrations of emissions to a level that will avoid a more than a 2 degree increase in average 
surface temperatures across the globe.15 This is a challenging level of reductions for the global 
community. The Australian Government’s independent expert advisor, Professor Garnaut, has made it 
clear that Australia needs to play a proportional part in achieving that 2 degree objective, and contributing 
to a reduction in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide equivalent of 450 parts per million.16  
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was signed by Australia in 1997 but not ratified until 2007 when the 
Rudd Government came to power. Unlike the general duties of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol 
contains specific emission reduction targets for each country. For Australia that was an increase of 8 per 
cent above our reported 1990 emission levels to be achieved by the end of the first commitment period in 
2012. Given the number of concessions granted to Australia, including the permitted 8 per cent increase, 
all indications are that we will meet that target in 2012.17 It is our predicted strong growth in emissions 
from 2012 onwards that poses the greatest challenge for the Government.18  
The Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms 
The Kyoto Protocol aims to achieve the global reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by committing 
Annex-1 Parties, including Australia, to binding targets to limit or reduce their aggregate anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions.19  It aims to achieve emissions reductions globally at the place where it is most 
cost-effective to do so, resulting in the creation of a number of flexibility mechanisms encompassing 
international emissions trading and the generation of credits from eligible sequestration and abatement 
projects.  
Each Annex-1 Party has been assigned a number of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) calculated in 
accordance with its permitted level of emissions for the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012. 20 
Once deemed eligible to trade, each Annex-1 Party may purchase additional AAUs through the 
international emissions trading market.21 Annex-1 Parties can create additional units, known as Certified 
Emission Reduction Units (CERs), through the implementation of eligible emissions reductions projects 
in developing countries under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).22 Emissions reduction projects 
may also be implemented by Annex-1 Parties, in other Annex-1 Party countries, under the Joint 
Implementation mechanism (JI).23 In that case, the host country will cancel the requisite number of units 
in its holding account and issue the same number of Emission Reduction Units (ERUs).24 While there is 
significant flexibility in the use of these mechanisms, they are only intended to be used as a supplement to 
direct domestic action to reduce or mitigate actual greenhouse gas emissions.25 Accordingly, domestic 
                                                            
15 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 16 March 
1998 (entered into force on 16 February 2005) [hereinafter “the Kyoto Protocol”]. 
16 Garnaut R, “Carbon Pricing and Reducing Australia’s Emissions: Update Paper No 6” (Garnaut Climate Change 
Review Update 2011, 2011) 2. 
17 Australian Government, “Australia’s Emissions Reduction Targets” (Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency) 1  <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/reduce/national-
targets/~/media/government/reduce/NationalTarget-Factsheet-20111201-PDF.pdf> viewed 10 January 2012. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Kyoto Protocol, art 3(1).  
20 UNFCCC, “Decision 13/CMP.1: Modalities for the Accounting of Assigned Amounts under Article 7, paragraph 
4, of the Kyoto Protocol: Annex: Modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Article 7, paragraph 4, of 
the Kyoto Protocol”(FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2) Section I (B) at [5]. 
21 Kyoto Protocol, art 17. 
22 Kyoto Protocol, art 12. 
23 Kyoto Protocol, art 6. 
24 Kyoto Protocol, art 6.1(b). 
25 UNFCCC, “Decision 15/CP.7 on Principles, nature and scope of the mechanisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 
17 of the Kyoto Protocol “ (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2, 21 January 2002) at 2; Kyoto Protocol, arts 5,7,8. 
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actions must constitute a “significant element” of the efforts made by each party to meet its target under 
the Kyoto Protocol.26 This principle will be carried over into the second commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol which will extend from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2017 (or 31 December 2020 - depending 
on the decision of the parties).27 Work on the quantified emission limitation or reduction objectives 
(QELROs) for that second commitment period is also continuing.28  In the meantime, the parties have 
agreed to develop a legal instrument, or agreed outcome with legal force, that would be applicable to all 
parties to the UNFCCC and would come into effect from 2020.29  
3. Setting The Carbon Price 
The Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism is intended to send a price signal to the market to influence 
emitting behaviours and reduce Australia’s national emissions in an environmentally effective and cost-
effective manner.30  Because of this, the level of that carbon price will play a central role in achieving 
emissions reductions. Unlike the previous carbon trading proposal, the Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme, the Carbon Pricing Mechanism will initially operate as a fixed charge for tradeable permits.31  In 
the fixed price stage, starting on 1 July 2012, the carbon price will start at AU$23 a tonne and increase to 
AU$24.15 in 2013-14 and AU$25.40 in 2014-15.32 During this phase, there will be no limit on the 
number of permits available at the relevant fixed price. Permits will be both freely allocated and available 
for purchase. 33  However, all permits purchased at the fixed price will be automatically surrendered and 
cannot be traded or banked for future use.34 
On 1 July 2015, the Carbon Pricing Mechanism is intended to transition to a flexible price period. For the 
first three years the price will not truly flexible as a price ceiling and price floor will apply.35 The 
Government’s independent expert advisor, Professor Garnaut warned against the use of a price ceiling or 
price floor, cautioning that setting the ceiling or floor would be inherently arbitrary and would damage 
greatly the normal operation of the market.36 In particular, although a price ceiling would limit the cost of 
mitigation it would render “unreliable the scheme’s capacity to deliver emissions reductions in relation to 
targets.”37 Despite this, a price ceiling and floor will be used in the early years of the Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism. The price ceiling will be initially set at AU$20 above the expected international price and 
will rise by 5 per cent in real terms each year.38 The price floor will be set at AU$15 rising annually by 4 
per cent in real terms.39 With the exception of units under the Carbon Farming Initiative (discussed later) 
Australian Carbon Units (ACUs) will not be permitted to be exported internationally while the domestic 
                                                            
26 Ibid.   
27 UNFCCC, “Emissions Trading and the Project-Based Mechanism” (CMP.7, December 2011, advance unedited 
version), [1]; UNFCCC, “Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex 
1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its sixteenth session” (CMP.7, December 2011, advance unedited version),[1]. 
28 UNFCCC, “Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex 1 Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol at its sixteenth session” (CMP.7, December 2011, advance unedited version), [4]. 
29 UNFCCC, “Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action” (CP.17, 
December 2011, advance unedited version) [4].  Work on this agreement will commence in the first half of 2012. 
30 Commentary on the Clean Energy Bill 2011, Australian Government Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency, 11 (2011) [hereinafter ‘Clean Energy Commentary’]. 
31 Clean Energy Commentary, n30, p 12. 
32Clean Energy Plan, n6, pp vii; 103. 
33Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 103. 
34Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 103. 
35 Clean Energy Commentary, n30, p 12. 
36 Final Report to the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments of Australia, Garnaut Climate Change 
Review, 314 (2008) [hereinafter “Garnaut Review”], p  335. 
37 Garnaut Review, n36, 335. 
38 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p xiii. 
39 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p xiii. 
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price floor and price ceiling is in place.40 This prohibition will be lifted once those price constraints are 
removed.41 During the flexible price period, permits under the Carbon Pricing Mechanism will be 
allocated by auctioning.42 Unlimited banking of permits will be allowed in the flexible price period. 
However, only limited borrowing of permits will be permitted.43  
 
4. Setting the Emissions Reduction Trajectory and Market Caps 
During the fixed price period there will be no limit or cap placed on Australia’s greenhouse gas 
emissions. As part of the transition to the flexible price period, the Government will need to determine the 
market cap and the limit to be placed on the number of permits released to the market. Ideally, this cap 
should align with the short and long-term policy commitments made by the Government to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. However, these in turn, should align with international agreement and follow 
the advice of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other expert advisors on the necessary 
global cuts for avoiding adverse climate change. The Government has announced the establishment of an 
independent Climate Change Authority to advise on pollution caps and progress towards meeting targets 
and to undertake reviews of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism, with the first report due in 2014.44 However, 
it should be noted that this advice is not binding on the Government and it has stated firmly that the 
Government will be making all final decisions.45  By the deadline of 31 May 2014, the Government is 
required to table regulations in Parliament setting the annual pollution caps for the years 2015- 2019 with 
the annual cap for 2020 to be set in 2016.46 In setting the pollution caps the Government must take into 
account, among other matters, voluntary action including the use of Green Power and voluntary 
cancellation of units.47 
Ongoing uncertainty regarding the scheme caps is a significant flaw in the design of the emissions trading 
scheme for Australia.  Ideally, the duty to reduce emissions, and corresponding scheme caps on 
emissions, should be determined well ahead of the other legal features of the scheme, such as allocations, 
compensation measures and offset provisions, all of which have the potential to conflict with or 
undermine the allocated cap.   
Setting the quantitative cap can be a troublesome political process not only because of competing social, 
economic and environmental needs and priorities but also owing to the fact that targets must be 
sufficiently flexible to adapt to ‘differential economic growth, uncertain technological change and 
evolving science’.48  A challenge which is well-demonstrated by the Kyoto Protocol, “which set its targets 
13 years before the date on which controls became effective .. and used baseline emissions from 20 years 
before the control period.”49 Without any action to reduce emissions, the Government estimates that, in 
                                                            
40 Unless an appropriate bilateral linkage is in place. 
41 Clean Energy Commentary, n30, p 92. 
42 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 104. 
43 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 104. in any particular compliance year, a liable entity can surrender permits from the 
following vintage year to discharge up to 5 per cent of their liability 
44 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p xiii; as established by the Climate Change Authority Act 2011 (Cth). 
45 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 27. 
46 Clean Energy Act, s 16; Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 26, 103. In the event the regulations are rejected by the 
Parliament, the Act contains default pollution caps (in line with the 5 per cent reduction target) for the years 2015 
onwards, Clean Energy Act, Part Two. 
47 Clean Energy Act, s 16; Clean Energy Plan, n6, pp103, 108. A Pledge Fund will be established to help individuals 
access the carbon market and voluntarily cancel emissions units. 
48 Nordhaus WD, 'The Many Advantages of Carbon Taxes' in Marsh I (ed), Growth 61 A Taxing Debate: Climate 
Policy Beyond Copenhagen (CEDA, Melbourne, 2009), 64 at p 66. 
49 Nordhaus, n48, p 66. 
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2020, Australia’s emissions will be 24 per cent above 2000 levels. 50 As noted, the Government has made 
a policy commitment to reduce national emissions by 5 per cent below 2000 levels by 2020 and 80 per 
cent below 2000 levels by 2050.51  In addition, the Government has also made conditional commitments 
to reduce emissions by up to 15 per cent52 or 25 per cent53 below 2000 levels depending on the scale of 
global action agreed to by the international community.54  Both of these commitments are dependent on 
the inclusion of avoided deforestation (REDD) and the land sector, including soil carbon, as part of the 
international agreement under the UNFCCC and/or Kyoto Protocol. 
One of the most important features of an effective “cap and trade” market is the presence of a 
comprehensive cap or limit on the number of permits released to the market.55  This cap acts as a 
volumetric control to ensure that greenhouse gas emissions, and atmospheric concentrations, will decline 
in accordance with the global reduction trajectory.56 The limit placed on available permits will create a 
“scarcity value” or price signal to modify the emitting behaviours of consumers and industry.57 During the 
flexible-price period and until 2020, at least 50 per cent of a liable party’s compliance obligation must be 
met through the use of Australian units or credits rather than through the purchase of international units.58 
This, in effect, means that the prescribed “market cap” for Australia is increased by the permitted 50 per 
cent import of international units. Furthermore, during the fixed-charge period, liable entities will be 
permitted to surrender up to 5 per cent of eligible credits from the Carbon Farming Initiative to satisfy 
their liabilities under the Carbon Pricing Mechanism .59 Once the flexible-charge period commences, 
                                                            
50 Australian Government, “Australia’s Emissions Reduction Targets” (Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency) 1  http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/reduce/national-
targets/~/media/government/reduce/NationalTarget-Factsheet-20111201-PDF.pdf viewed 10 January 2012. 
51 Clean Energy Plan, n6,  Chapter Two-Targets for Action. 
52 The conditions are that there must be an international agreement where major developing economies commit to 
substantially restrain emissions and advanced economies take on commitments comparable to Australia’s including: 
global action on track to stabilisation between 510-540ppm CO2-e; advanced economy reductions in aggregate, in 
the range of 15 – 25% below 1990 levels; substantive measurable, reportable and verifiable commitments and 
actions by major developing economies,  and progress toward inclusion of forests (REDD) and the land sector, 
Australian Government, “Australia’s Emissions Reduction Targets” (Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency) 2  http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/reduce/national-
targets/~/media/government/reduce/NationalTarget-Factsheet-20111201-PDF.pdf viewed 10 January 2012. 
53 The conditions are the achievement of comprehensive global action capable of stabilising CO2-e concentrations at 
450ppm CO2-e or lower with major developing economies slowing the growth and then reducing their emissions 
and advanced economies taking on reductions and commitments comparable to Australia. This includes 
comprehensive coverage of gases, sources and sectors, with inclusion of forests (REDD) and the land sector 
(including soil carbon initiatives (e.g. bio char) if scientifically demonstrated); a clear global trajectory, where the 
sum of all economies’ commitments is consistent with 450ppm CO2-e or lower, and with a nominated early 
deadline year for peak global emissions not later than 2020; advanced economy reductions, in aggregate, of at least 
25% below 1990 levels by 2020;  major developing economy commitments that slow emissions growth and then 
reduce their absolute level of emissions over time, with a collective reduction of at least 20% below business-as-
usual by 2020 and a nomination of a peaking year for individual major developing economies, Australian 
Government, “Australia’s Emissions Reduction Targets” (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency) 2  
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/reduce/national-targets/~/media/government/reduce/NationalTarget-
Factsheet-20111201-PDF.pdf viewed 10 January 2012. 
54 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 14 
55 Garnaut Review, n36, p 314.  
56 Garnaut Review, n36, pp 317, 322. 
57 Garnaut Review, n36, pp 311-312. 
58 Clean Energy Commentary, n30, p 33; Clean Energy Act, Part 6. 
59 Subject to the regulations, these will include Kyoto-compliant carbon credits under the CFI and non-Kyoto 
compliant carbon credits issued for eligible offsets projects where a Kyoto-compliant credit would have been issued 
if the reporting period had ended before the Kyoto abatement deadline (as defined under the CFI Act), Clean Energy 
Act, s. 5; Clean Energy Commentary, n30, p 119. 
7 
 
there will be no restrictions on the number of eligible Carbon Farming Initiative credits able to be 
surrendered under the Carbon Pricing Mechanism.60  
The Government’s advisor, Garnaut, has stressed that “the integrity of the trajectory and the overall 
emissions budget is paramount in order to satisfy the scarcity principle.”61 This increased supply of 
credits, above the ‘cap’, could distort the price signal and undermine the environmental effectiveness and 
economic efficiency of the Australian carbon market.62 As Garnaut has cautioned, “most damaging of all 
would be measures that rendered ineffective the credibility of the quantitative restriction (the emissions 
limit) on which the entire emissions trading scheme is predicated.”63  
5. Scheme Coverage: Identifying the Liable Entities 
A comprehensive and well-designed emissions trading scheme must clearly identify who is covered by 
the scheme, which sectors and which greenhouse gases? 64 To be compatible with the international 
climate change market, the Australian scheme should extend to all six greenhouse gases identified under 
the Kyoto Protocol. However, the Carbon Pricing Mechanism will cover only four of the six greenhouse 
gases counted under the Kyoto Protocol, that is, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and 
perfluorocarbons from aluminium smelting.65 High global warming potential synthetic greenhouse gases 
(other than perfluorocarbons from aluminium smelting) will be excluded from the Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism. Instead they will be subject to an equivalent carbon price using import and manufacture 
levies under the existing Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management Act 1989 (Cth).66  
From 1 July 2013, incentives will also be provided for the destruction of waste synthetic greenhouse 
gases, including ozone depleting substances, that are recovered at the end-of-life.67 
A primary concern will be identifying those sectors to be included in the Carbon Pricing Mechanism.  
Broadening the scope of trading schemes will tend to lower costs and reduce price volatility.68 While a 
large number of participants will improve the functioning of the overall market this also involves higher 
administration and monitoring costs. The number of participants must be able to be managed 
administratively as well as being able to accurately monitor and verify the emissions from each liable 
entity.  Accordingly to Garnaut, coverage of the Australian emissions trading scheme should be as broad 
as possible within practical constraints imposed by measurability and transaction costs in order to, 
“provide an incentive for emissions reductions in all sectors according to lowest-cost mitigation 
opportunities, maximise market liquidity and stability” and to avoid distortions.69 Garnaut noted that 
emissions from stationary energy, transport, waste, and industrial processes should all be included in an 
emissions trading scheme with the inclusion of agriculture and forestry once measurement and monitoring 
concerns were resolved.70 This broad coverage would: 
i. provide an incentive for emissions reductions in all sectors according to lowest-cost mitigation 
principles; 
ii. maximise market liquidity and stability; 
iii. distribute costs of the scheme in ways that minimise distortions in resource allocation; and 
                                                            
60 Clean Energy Commentary, n30, p 94. 
61 Garnaut Review, n36, p 325. 
62 Garnaut Review, n36, p 311. 
63 Garnaut Review, n36, p 314. 
64 Garnaut Review, n36, p 317. 
65 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 104. 
66 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 105 
67 Clean Energy Plan, n6,  p 105 
68 Garnaut Review, n36, p 338. 
69 Garnaut Review, n36, p 326.  
70 Garnaut Review, n36, p 358. 
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iv. facilitate integration with other markets.71 
The Carbon Pricing Mechanism will apply to approximately 500 entities across the stationary energy 
sector, select areas of the transport sector (domestic aviation, domestic shipping, rail), industrial 
processes, non-legacy waste72, and fugitive emissions.73 To be a liable entity under the Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism, entities must generally be in operational control of facilities which have a total amount of 
covered emissions of 25,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per annum or more.74 
Transport fuels will be excluded from the Carbon Pricing Mechanism. Where applicable, an equivalent 
carbon price will be applied through changes in fuel tax credits or excise.75 However, a carbon price will 
not apply to household transport fuels, light vehicle business transport and off-road fuel use by the 
agriculture, forestry and fishing industries.76 
 
Agriculture and forestry are excluded from the scheme despite Garnaut’s recommendation that the land 
sector should be included once measurement and monitoring concerns were resolved.77 This is a 
significant point of difference between the Carbon Pricing Mechanism and the Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme (CPRS). In the CPRS, forest landholders were able to “opt in” eligible reforestation 
activities and generate permanent tradable credits from net sequestration.78 Where sequestration levels 
dropped, the project proponent was a liable entity and required to surrender permits for its net emissions. 
By including reforestation as a liable entity within the CPRS, the Government had sought to avoid the 
administrative issues and compliance costs associated with ensuring that forestry credits were additional 
to business as usual and permanently maintained.79 Under the Carbon Pricing Mechanism, offset credits 
will be generated in Australia under a separate Carbon Farming Initiative, discussed further below. 
 
6. Assistance Measures for Liable Entities and Households 
A controversial aspect of Australia’s emissions trading scheme has been the provision of transitional 
assistance to emissions-intensive-trade-exposed industries through the issue of free allowances or other 
payments.80 The principle behind this assistance is to protect Australian firms from the adverse impacts of 
a carbon price in those industries where overseas trade competitors are not subject to similar carbon 
constraints or carbon pricing.81 However, Garnaut has warned against the “arbitrary nature” of such 
assistance measures and warned, in particular, against the allocation of free permits in any 
circumstances.82 His firm advice has been that all permits should be auctioned with assistance provided to 
                                                            
71 Garnaut Review, n36, p 326. 
72 Landfill facilities will not be liable for emissions that arise from waste deposited prior to 1 July 2012, Clean 
Energy Plan, n6, p 105. 
73 Clean Energy Act, Part 3. 
74 Clean Energy Act, Part 3. Where a facility is operated by an Unincorporated Joint Venture and no one person has 
operational control over the facility, the emissions liability for that facility will instead be allocated between the joint 
venture participants in proportion to their interest in the facility. Clean Energy Plan, n[], p 105. 
75Clean Energy Plan, n6,  p xiii. 
76 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p xiii. 
77 Garnaut Review, n36, p 358; Update Paper No 4: Transforming Rural Land Use, Garnaut Climate Change 
Review, 49 (2011).  
78 Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2010 (Cth), Part 10 [hereinafter “CPRS”].  
79 Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper, Australian Government, Department of Climate Change, 127 
(2008). 
80 Garnaut Review, n36, p 317. 
81 Garnaut Review, n36, p 341. 
82 Garnaut Review, n36, p 332. 
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emissions-intensive-trade-exposed industries using a crediting mechanism rather than freely allocated 
permits.83 
The Government has determined that certain emissions-intensive-trade-exposed industries will be 
constrained in their ability to pass on the price of permits to their consumers and that transitional 
assistance is warranted.84 This assistance package includes the AU$9.2 billion Jobs and Competitiveness 
Program which will provide support to emissions-intensive and trade-exposed activities that generate 
over 80 per cent of emissions within the manufacturing sector.85 Eligibility is based on the historic 
industry average baseline for carbon emissions from these sectors. The Government has acknowledged 
that the specific intention of this assistance is to “shield eligible businesses from the full impact of a 
carbon price.”86 Eligible activities for assistance include aluminum production, steel manufacturing, pulp 
and paper manufacturing, glass making, cement production and petroleum refining.87  
Despite the recommendations of Garnaut, this assistance will be provided in the form of free permits. The 
most emissions-intensive and trade-exposed activities will initially be eligible for 94.5 per cent shielding 
from the carbon price.88 Those activities assessed as having a lower risk of carbon leakage will be eligible 
for 66 per cent shielding from the carbon price.89 Liquefied Natural Gas projects will also receive a 
supplementary allocation of permits with an effective assistance rate of 50 per cent of the carbon price.90 
Those assistance rates will be reduced by a “carbon productivity contribution” of 1.3 per cent per year, 
this is designed to ensure that incentives increase over time, in these industries, to reduce their carbon 
emissions.91 In addition to this assistance, the steel manufacturing industry will also receive financial 
assistance through an AU$300 million five year Steel Transformation Plan, designed to encourage 
investment and innovation in the Australian steel manufacturing industry.92 The Government has further 
announced the Energy Security Fund through which approximately AU$5.5 billion in assistance, in the 
form of free permits, cash incentives and loans, to highly emissions-intensive coal-fired generators.93 The 
intention behind the award of these free permits is to provide transitional assistance to “help generators 
that face sizeable losses in the value of their assets and support investor confidence, and underpin the 
investment in generation assets that is required to ensure that Australia’s future energy security needs are 
met.”94Assistance is conditional on the generator providing the Minister with a Clean Energy Investment 
Plan setting out the plans (if any) for reducing the emissions-intensity of the generation complex.95 The 
Energy Security Fund will also be used to negotiate the closure of around 2,000 megawatts of highly 
emissions-intensive coal-fired generation capacity, across Australia, by the year 2020 generator.96 A 
                                                            
83 Garnaut Review, n36, pp 345, 332. 
84 CPRS, Part 8.  
85 Clean Energy Act, Part 7; Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 54. 
86 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 55. 
87 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 54. 
88 Where the historic industry average baseline emissions are > 2000 tonnes CO2 equivalent/AU$ million revenue. 
Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 55. 
89 Where the historic industry average baseline emissions are > 1000-1999 tonnes CO2 equivalent/AU$ million 
revenue. Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 55. 
90 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 55. 
91 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 55. 
92 Steel Transformation Plan Act 2011 (Cth); Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 133. In addition, the industry will benefit 
from a 10 per cent increase in its emissions baseline for the production of certain steel products linked with national 
infrastructure. 
93 Clean Energy Act, Part 8; Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 71. 
94 Clean Energy Act, s159. 
95 Clean Energy Act, Part 8, Division 5. 
96 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 71. 
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generator will not be able to gain access to the free permits under the Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) once a 
closure contract is in force.97  
The Government also announced an additional Coal Sector Jobs Package which includes AU$1.3 billion 
financial assistance over 6 years for coal mines with high levels of fugitive emissions, based on historical 
emissions intensity data.98 This is intended to protect jobs while those “gassy mines” investigate options 
for reducing their fugitive emissions. Finally, the Government will also be introducing assistance to 
support households.99 The Household Assistance Measures program is comprised of an AU$8 billion tax 
reform package, including AU$7 billion of tax cuts, to shield households from an increase in the cost of 
living from the introduction of the carbon price as well as increases in pensions, allowances and 
benefits.100  
As can be seen from the preceding overview, it is clear that Australia’s Carbon Pricing Mechanism will 
come hand in hand with significant measures to ease the initial price impact of the pricing mechanism on 
Australian industry, households and the economy. While some assistance to low income and vulnerable 
individuals and sectors may be warranted, these broad scale buffers are much more worrying from a 
design perspective.  The Carbon Pricing Mechanism is designed to create a pollution liability. It is this 
obligation to “pay a price” for carbon emissions that is intended to send a price signal to the community 
to influence our emitting behaviours and reduce emissions. The principles of environmental law tell us 
that the polluter should be the one held responsible for the environmental and social cost of emitting 
pollution and causing harm. Providing a significant number of free permits or providing access to a large 
number of low cost permits may weaken this necessary price signal and prevent this economic instrument 
from achieving emissions reductions. Clearly the Government does not agree with this point of view, or 
with the advice of Garnaut. The Government has stated not only that these are necessary transitionary 
measures but also that the incentive to reduce emissions will remain despite the provision of assistance.  
In particular, the allocation of free permits is said to provide industry with an incentive to carry out 
changes in their emitting practices. This is because those holders of freely allocated permits who find 
themselves holding excess permits (given that allocations are based on historic average emissions) will be 
able to sell those permits back to the Government at the current market price.101 However, the real effect 
of these free allocations has been the phenomenal use of political lobbying and public protests by industry 
to emphasise the drastic impacts of the carbon price on the sustainability of their sectors in an attempt to 
increase the assistance measures provided by the Government.  
 
7. Personal Property and the Tradable Permit 
One of the most important features of an effective Carbon Pricing Mechanism is the ability to trade 
permits during the flexible price period. Tradability of permits requires a number of matters to be 
addressed including that: 
i. permit characteristics and the benefits they bestow are unambiguous; 
ii. the terms and conditions of trade are commonly understood; 
iii. those wanting to participate have ready access to the market; 
                                                            
97 Clean Energy Act, Part 8, Division 6. 
98 Clean Energy Regulations 2011 (Cth); Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 134. Eligible coal mines will be those mines that 
had a fugitive emissions intensity in 2008-09 of at least 0.1 tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent per tonne of saleable 
coal produced. Assistance will be provided to eligible coal mines for up to 80 per cent of their fugitive emissions 
exposure above that 0.1 threshold. 
99 Clean Energy (Household Assistance Amendments) Act 2011(Cth). 
100 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p xv. 
101 The holders of freely allocated permits will be able to sell them to the Government from 1 September of the 
compliance year in which they were issued until 1 February of the following compliance year; Clean Energy Plan, 
n6, p 103; Clean Energy Act, Part 4, Division 5. 
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iv. transactions can be secured at minimal cost; and 
v. offer and bid prices are transparently available.102 
The effectiveness of the proposed Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism could be seriously undermined 
by the absence of adequate legal reform to ensure the optimal operation of the carbon market including 
provisions to ensure that property rights in the tradable credits are fully defined.103 In order to be of 
financial value, the credits must be recognised and protected as “property” by the legal system in which 
the credit is held. This means that the legal instrument must be clearly defined and appropriately protected 
by rules securing ownership, transfer and other dealings.104  Without the presence of these legal attributes, 
the allocated legal instrument will be more akin to regulatory property, with limited property protections, 
than a commodity and will attract a lesser value with repercussions for the effectiveness of the market 
system.105   
The Clean Energy Act intends to establish carbon permits which are “personal property” and 
“transmissible by assignment, by will and by devolution by operation of law.”106 Carbon credits will be 
held in the Commonwealth Australian National Registry and ownership and transfer will be subject to the 
requirements of the Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) and the Australian National Registry of Emissions Units 
Act 2011 (Cth). The Clean Energy Act states that that the registered holder of a carbon unit is the legal 
owner of the unit and may deal with the unit as its legal owner and give good discharges for any 
consideration for any such dealing.107 However, the Act goes on to specifically limit the protection 
provided by that provision to only those persons who deal with the registered holder of the unit as a 
purchaser in good faith for value; and without notice of any defect in the title of the registered holder.108 
Future provisions may also enable the registration in the Australian National Registry of equitable 
interests in relation to carbon units  - provided it is not a security interest under the Personal Property 
Securities Act 2009 (Cth).109 The legislation otherwise states that, for the avoidance of doubt, the Act does 
not affect the creation of; any dealings with; the enforcement of; or equitable interests in relation to a 
carbon unit.110 As a result, it appears that there will be dealings with these carbon units that are not subject 
to the Commonwealth registry but instead subject to the principles and requirements of the Australian 
State and Territory property law regimes. No additional legal reform has been proposed to clarify the 
legal treatment of these carbon units by the existing property law systems of the States and Territories. 
Those schemes vary significantly and it is possible that not all of these jurisdictions will recognise and 
protect this new form of property in an effective manner.  The legal uncertainties created by this could 
affect the inherent financial value of these instruments within the market system as well as introducing 
additional transaction costs for market participants.111 These concerns are magnified when we consider 
that the Government is intending to allow international trade in these legal instruments meaning 
ownership rights will vary depending on the international jurisdiction in which the permit is created and 
legal recognition of the property rights of the holder of the permit in the overseas jurisdiction in which the 
permit is held. By default, this will necessitate greater reliance on due diligence prior to purchase, and 
reliance on contractual warranties at the point of sale, to provide greater certainty and protection to the 
legal interests of the carbon credit holder. 
                                                            
102 Garnaut Review, n36, p 324. 
103 Garnaut Review, n36, p 331. 
104 Yandle B, "Grasping for the Heavens: 3-D Property Rights and the Global Commons" (1999 -2000) 10 Duke 
Environmental Law & Policy Forum 13 at p 15. 
105 For a discussion of commodification in the water context see Gray J, "Legal Approaches to the Management and 
Regulation of Water from Riparian Rights to Commodification" (2006)1(2) Transforming Cultures eJournal 64. 
106 Clean Energy Act, s103.  
107 Clean Energy Act, s103A(1). 
108 Clean Energy Act, s103A(2). 
109  Clean Energy Act, s109A. 
110 Clean Energy Act, s110. 
111 Garnaut Review, n36, p 324. 
12 
 
8. Scheme Governance: Monitoring and Reporting 
Scheme governance will also have implications for the efficiency, stability and credibility of any future 
Australian emissions trading scheme.  The effectiveness of the market as an innovative policy tool will 
require that appropriate monitoring and verification of the creation and trade of emissions instruments 
takes place as well as ensuring the imposition of sanctions for any identified non-compliances.112  
Consequently, transparent, credible and efficient reporting of emissions will be an essential component of 
any effective trading scheme.113 However, monitoring a high number of participants will require 
significant resourcing of Government departments with appropriate expertise.  There is also the risk that 
vested interests may attempt to place pressures on Government to favour them in administrative 
decisions.  Because of these factors, Garnaut has stressed that the integrity, efficiency and effectiveness of 
the Carbon Pricing Mechanism would require “the establishment of an independent carbon bank with all 
the necessary powers to oversee the long-term stability of the scheme.”114 In response, the Government 
announced the establishment of the Clean Energy Regulator to administer the Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism, Carbon Farming Initiative, national renewable energy target and the National Greenhouse 
and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) (NGER Act).115 
Monitoring and reporting obligations are implemented in Australia through a separate scheme. Under the 
NGER Act, a controlling corporation must apply to be registered if the corporation’s group of facilities 
meets one or more of the thresholds for a financial year.116 A registered corporation, or holder of a 
reporting transfer certificate,117 must provide a report to the regulator for each relevant financial year.118 
The report must address the greenhouse gas emissions, energy production and energy consumption for the 
reporting year and be based on the methods determined by the Minister.119  Failure to comply with the 
reporting requirements of the NGER Act may result in civil and pecuniary penalties for both the 
registered corporation and the chief executive officer (CEO) of the corporation.120  
It is critical that appropriate penalties and liabilities are imposed by the regulator to identified cases of 
non-compliance with the surrender requirements of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism. That penalty should 
be significantly higher than the market price of the permit in order to act as a proper deterrent.  To ensure 
that the aggregate cap is not exceeded, there should also be imposed an obligation to “make good” the 
excess emissions and to acquire and surrender emissions instruments from the market.121  Under the 
Carbon Pricing Mechanism, emissions obligations that are not met through the surrender of eligible 
emissions units must be met by paying an emissions charge for each tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent 
that has not been surrendered. 122 However, no make good provision has been included in the Carbon 
                                                            
112 Tietenberg T et al, 'International Rules for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: Defining the principles, 
modalities, rules and guidelines for verification, reporting and accountability' (UNCTAD/GDS/GFSB/Misc.6, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1999), 53, at p 84. 
113 Garnaut Review, n36, p 328. 
114 Garnaut Review, n36, p 321. 
115 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 34. Established by the Clean Energy Regulator Act 2011 (Cth). 
116 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) [hereinafter “NGER Act”], s12. Those thresholds are 
generally 50 kilotonnes or more of greenhouse gases emitted from the operation of facilities under the operational 
control of entities; 200 terajoules or more of energy produced from the operation of facilities under the operational 
control of entities and 200 terajoules or more of energy consumed from the operation of facilities under the 
operational control of entities. The threshold is also triggered where an individual facility within a group causes 
emission of greenhouse gases of 25 kilotonnes or more; production of energy of 100 terajoules or more; or 
consumption of energy of 100 terajoules or more. NGER Act, s13. 
117 Which has the effect of transferring liability from the corporation with operational control to a third party.  
118 NGER Act, s 19. 
119 NGER Act, s 19. National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (Measurement) Determination 2008 (Cth). 
120 NGER Act, Part 5.  
121 A similar approach was considered in the Garnaut Review, n36, pp 17, 44. 
122 Clean Energy Plan, n6, p 107. 
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Pricing Mechanism.  During the fixed price period, the emissions charge for the surrender obligations will 
be 1.3 times the fixed price for permits (AU$29.90 for 2012-13, AU$31.40 for 2013-14 and AU$33.00 
for 2014-15).123 During the flexible price period, the emissions charge for any shortfall will be 200 per 
cent of the benchmark average auction charge for the previous financial year.124 
 
9. The Creation and Use of Offset Credits from Forestry and Agriculture 
To be compatible with the United Nations and meet Australia’s emission reduction obligations, the 
Government should be seeking to design its domestic scheme to be consistent with the rules set under the 
Kyoto Protocol for the recognition and treatment of sequestration activities.  This includes ensuring that 
biological sequestration (biosequestration) offsets meet the international prerequisites of environmental 
credibility, namely, that they are additional to business as usual, independently verified and that they 
provide a permanent emissions abatement.125 However, these standards have not been adhered to in the 
Australian Carbon Farming Initiative.   
The Carbon Farming Initiative is an economic incentive scheme designed to enable farmers and other 
land managers to undertake eligible offsets projects and to be rewarded by additional income from the 
sale of carbon credits generated under the scheme. The types of project permitted under the scheme will 
include both Kyoto-compliant and non-Kyoto-compliant activities, including emission-avoidance offsets 
projects (agricultural, landfill, introduced-animals) and sequestration offsets projects (living biomass, 
dead organic matter, soil).126  Methodologies are in the process of being developed for the Carbon 
Farming Initiative and these will identify the applicable measurement and monitoring protocols and other 
technical requirements for the different project types.  
A diverse range of methodologies have been released for public consultation to date. These include 
reforestation; savanna-fire management; landfill gas recovery; manure management in intensive livestock 
farming (piggeries); and, rather unusually, feral animal management (camel culling).127 Future 
methodologies are likely to address native-forest protection projects (avoided deforestation), soil-carbon 
sequestration, and biochar.128 The Carbon Farming Initiative will generate Kyoto-compliant or non-
Kyoto-compliant tradeable credits depending on the type of project and its eligibility under the Kyoto 
Protocol. In the meantime, the Australian Government is seeking to expand the types of eligible activities 
under the Kyoto Protocol, to include soil carbon and deforestation, as part of its international negotiations 
for the post-2012 regime.129 
The CDM mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol was one of the first examples of an international market-
based offset mechanism designed to contribute to global efforts to reduce atmospheric concentrations of 
                                                            
123 Clean Energy (Unit Shortfall Charge—General) Act 2011 (Cth), s 8. 
124 Unless a lesser rate is prescribed by the regulations, Clean Energy (Unit Shortfall Charge—General) Act 2011 
(Cth), section 8. 
125 UNFCCC, “Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention” (COP 17; December 2011; advance unedited version), E [79]. 
126 CFI Act, Part 3, Division 12. 
127 ‘Carbon Farming Initiative: Offset Methodologies, Australian Government, Department of Climate Change and 
Energy Efficiency, available at <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/carbon-farming-
initative/methodology-development/methodologies-under-consideration.aspx> viewed 10 January 2012. 
128 A native forest is defined to exclude plantations. However, the definition notes that “it is immaterial whether any 
of the trees have been established with human assistance following flood; bushfire; drought; pest attack; or disease”, 
CFI Act, s 5. 
129 Significant progress was made on the inclusion of deforestation  at COP 17 in December 2011.  See UNFCCC, 
“Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention” 
(COP 17; December 2011; advance unedited version), C; and UNFCCC, “Land Use, Land-Use Change and 
Forestry” (CMP 7; December 2011; advance unedited version). 
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greenhouse gases. The CDM is by no means a perfect mechanism and the test of additionality under the 
CDM, in particular, has been criticized for being both overly complex and inherently subjective.130 This 
has led to higher transaction costs in the carrying out of CDM projects.131 These concerns regarding the 
weaknesses of the CDM appear to have influenced the Government in its design of the Carbon Farming 
Initiative. In contrast to the CDM, under the Carbon Farming Initiative activities are deemed to have met 
the additionality test where they are contained on the “positive list” in the regulations and are not in 
response to a requirement under any law of the Commonwealth, State, or Territory.132  
In considering activities for inclusion on the positive list, the Minister was required to have regard to the 
advice of the Domestic Offsets Integrity Committee and to consider whether the carrying out of the 
project is “not common practice” in the relevant industry or environment.133 Financial additionality was 
not required to be demonstrated. Baseline setting was also simplified and this is stated simply as being 
calculated on the assumption that the project is not carried out.134 While these modifications have come 
from a desire to reduce transaction costs, the lack of compatibility with the rules of the CDM will have 
consequences in terms of the ability to surrender Carbon Farming Initiative credits as eligible offsets 
under the post-2012 Kyoto Protocol regime and other linked international carbon markets. 
Additional activities included on the “positive list” currently include: 
 The establishment of permanent plantings on or after 1 July 2007; 
 The human-induced regeneration, on or after 1 July 2007, of native vegetation, on land that is not 
conservation land, by:  
(i) the exclusion of livestock; or  
(ii) the management of the timing and the extent of grazing; or  
(iii) the management, in a humane manner, of feral animals; or  
(iv) the management of plants that are not native to the project area; or  
(v) the cessation of mechanical or chemical destruction, or suppression, of regrowth;  
 The application of biochar to soil;  
 The capture and combustion of methane from livestock manure; 
 Early dry season burning of savanna areas greater than 1 km2; 
 The reduction of methane emissions through the humane management of feral goats, feral deer, feral 
pigs or feral camels; 
 The reduction of emissions from ruminants by manipulation of their digestive processes; 
 The application of urease or nitrification inhibitors to, or with, livestock manure or fertiliser; and 
 The capture and combustion of methane from waste deposited in a landfill facility before 1 July 
2012.135 
 
Permanence is a significant issue in the design of the Carbon farming Initiative. Sequestered carbon can 
be released to the atmosphere as a result of land clearing, timber harvesting, bushfires, disease and decay 
of the trees. Because of this, the Kyoto Protocol CDM created only temporary credits for afforestation and 
reforestation projects under the first commitment period. However, this approach has not been adhered to 
                                                            
130 See Durrant Nicola, Legal Responses to Climate Change, (Federation Press, 2010) p 61. 
131 Garnaut Review, n36, p182. 
132 CFI Act, s 41. 
133 CFI Act, Part 9, Division 3. 
134 CFI Act, s 107. 
135 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Regulations 2011 (Cth), 3.28. 
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in the domestic context and the Carbon Farming Initiative will issue permanent carbon credits for these 
temporary abatement activities.136  
Under the Carbon Farming Initiative, forest operators are only held liable for any net losses in carbon 
stocks for a maximum 100 year period and there are mechanisms in place for the removal of that 
obligation upon payment of financial penalty.137  There is no mechanism in place under the scheme for 
the cancellation of these permanent credits following the loss of carbon stocks from which they 
originated. 
During the fixed charge period, liable entities will be permitted to surrender up to 5 per cent of eligible 
credits from the Carbon Farming Initiative to satisfy their liabilities under the Carbon Pricing Mechanism. 
Once the flexible charge period commences, there will be no restrictions on the number of eligible credits 
able to be surrendered from the Carbon Farming Initiative. This will have the effect of increasing the 
allocated “market cap” under the Carbon Pricing Mechanism by an undetermined amount, undermining 
the price signal.  
The use of these permanent credits from temporary emission reductions has significant repercussions for 
the credibility of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism.  These credits can be purchased, held and surrendered 
by Australian entities - purporting to represent a permanent emissions abatement that no longer exists.  
These credits can also be traded to other parties to the Kyoto Protocol on the international market as well 
as into other international and regional trading systems.  This could have very negative implications for 
both the economic value of Australia’s credits in those markets as well as the overall effectiveness of both 
the Australian and international schemes in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  As rightly noted by 
Garnaut, “linking with an economy that has a flawed domestic mitigation system will result in the import 
of those flaws.”138   
10. Linkages with the International Kyoto Protocol Carbon Market 
In order for Australia to be eligible to trade on the Kyoto Protocol Market it must have complied with the 
eligibility requirements for participation. These include requirements to have in place a national system 
for the estimation of emissions; to submit annual estimates of emissions and, importantly, to maintain a 
specified level of reserve emissions instruments within the party’s national registry as follows: 
each Party included in Annex I shall maintain, in its national registry, a commitment period reserve which 
should not drop below 90 per cent of the Party’s assigned amount calculated pursuant to Article 3, 
paragraphs 7 and 8, of the Kyoto Protocol, or 100 per cent of five times its most recently reviewed 
inventory, whichever is lowest. 139   
 
Australia has established an electronic national registry, known as the Australian National Registry of 
Emissions Units, as required by the Kyoto Protocol and this holds Australia’s allocation of AAUs for the 
first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.140 
                                                            
136 CFI Act, Part 11, Division 2. A risk reversal buffer of 5 per cent will be subtracted from the total calculated net 
abatement/sequestration number for the project to protect against the risk of loss of stocks from natural disturbances. 
137 CFI Act, Part 8. 
138 Garnaut Review, n36, p 337. 
139 UNFCCC ‘Decision 11/CMP 1: Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for Emissions Trading under Article 17 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, Annex: Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for Emissions Trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol’, (FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add 2) at [6]-[11].   
140 This includes the  2,957,579,143 AAUs received from the UNFCCC Secretariat on 14 July 2009, Australian 
Government, “Australian National Registry of Emissions Units” (Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency, 2011) < http://www.climatechange.gov.au/Home/government/initiatives/anreu.aspx > viewed 10 January 
2012. 
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The Kyoto Protocol permits trade on the international market by private entities where they are authorised 
to trade on behalf of a State and Australia has indicated that it will extend that authorisation to private 
entities.141  During the fixed charge period, international emissions units will not be able to be surrendered 
in compliance with the Carbon Pricing Mechanism.142 However, during the flexible price period eligible 
international units may be acquired and surrendered in compliance with the Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism.143 Eligible international units currently include the following units issued under the Kyoto 
Protocol: CERs (other than a long-term or temporary CERs issued in relation to CDM forestry projects); 
ERUs generated by JI projects and removal units (RMUs).144 AAUs are not able to be surrendered in 
compliance with the Carbon Pricing Mechanism. The Government has also indicated that future 
restrictions will be imposed on the types of eligible international units.145   
Despite the involvement of private players with Australia, the Government will remain ultimately 
responsible for compliance with its obligations and with the pre-requisites for eligibility to trade under the 
Kyoto Protocol.146 The UNFCCC Secretariat monitors all sales and purchases of permits through an 
International Transaction Log (ITL).  For each proposed private or public transaction of allowances 
between registries, the ITL automatically verifies the validity of the transaction, including for example, 
whether both States are eligible to trade. 147 In the event of an identified discrepancy the transaction will 
be cancelled and any resulting losses to transacting parties (be they public or private) will lie where they 
fall. 148   
11. Future Linkages with Overseas Carbon Trading Schemes 
An efficient carbon trading system requires a large number of players and volume of trades in order to 
reduce mitigation costs and price volatility.149 Accordingly, the Government should be seeking to 
establish a trading system that is able to link with other existing domestic and regional carbon trading 
markets.150 The Government intends to establish bilateral links with those schemes that are considered to 
be of a suitable standard, based on a range of criteria including: 
 an internationally acceptable (or, where applicable, a mutually acceptable) level of mitigation 
commitment; 
 adequate and comparable monitoring, reporting, verification, compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms; and 
 compatibility in design and market rules.151 
The Government is particularly interested in establishing future linkages with the European Union and 
New Zealand trading schemes and commenced discussions at the international climate change 
                                                            
141 Ibid. 
142 Clean Energy Commentary, n30, p 92. 
143 Clean Energy Commentary, n30, p 33 
144 Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011(Cth), s 4. 
145 Including restrictions on removal units (RMUs) issued on the basis of land use, land-use change and forestry 
activities under Article 3.3 or 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol and CERs or ERUs from nuclear projects, the destruction of 
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not consistent with criteria adopted by the EU (based on the World Commission on Dams guidelines). See Clean 
Energy Commentary, n30, p 93. 
146 UNFCCC ‘Decision 11/CMP 1: Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for Emissions Trading under Article 17 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, Annex: Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for Emissions Trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto 
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negotiations in Durban. Consistency between the schemes would be a critical prerequisite to a positive 
linkage. These linkages should only occur if Australia has designed its scheme with all the necessary legal 
features and in a manner compatible with the key legal features of those other trading schemes. In short, 
this is an area where it does not pay for the Australian Government to be too clever, or too creative, in 
establishing a very different creature of trading system. This includes consistency in coverage of sectors 
and inclusion of greenhouse gases, in approaches to the recognition of eligible offsetting activities, in the 
use of price ceilings and price floors and in the monitoring and verification methodologies. However, in 
all of these aspects, the design features of the Australian scheme do not conform to the features of the 
European Union and New Zealand trading schemes.    
12. The Future of Australia’s Carbon Pricing Mechanism? 
While the passage of legislation to establish an emissions trading system is a very positive step for 
Australia, this analysis has identified a number of aspects of concern in the design of the Australian 
Carbon Pricing Mechanism. It is possible that these issues, either alone or in combination, will act to 
undermine the effectiveness of the Australian scheme both in terms of the price signal that is sent to 
emitters and in terms of the credibility of the scheme in achieving actual reductions in Australia’s 
greenhouse gas emissions. In the meantime, one of the most critical prerequisites for an effective carbon 
trading system, that is clarity and predictability about the future rules and shape of the trading scheme, 
remains stubbornly elusive.152 Given Australia’s current political climate, it is quite possible that the 
Government will be displaced at the coming elections in late 2013. The leader of the opposing Coalition 
party has vowed to repeal the “Carbon Tax” as soon as his party gains power and has made it clear that 
compensation will not be payable to those affected by the repeal of the trading scheme.153 Opinion is 
divided on whether this is politically, financially or legally feasible. The Government has deliberately 
designed the scheme so that the complex financial assistance mechanisms, tax reforms, subsidies, levies, 
free allocations and auctioning of units will all be deeply embedded at the time of the next election. If the 
Coalition party does not win a majority in the House of Representatives or Senate then it would need the 
support of other members of Parliament, including those Labor, Greens and Independent MPs who have 
designed the trading scheme and have made it clear that they will not lend their support to its repeal.154 
The only alternative would be for the Government to trigger the double dissolution provisions under the 
Australian Constitution leading to a double dissolution election and subsequent joint sitting of both 
Houses of Parliament.155 This would be likely to provide the Government with sufficient numbers to pass 
the legislation to repeal the scheme.156 
If the legislation is repealed, then the question remains whether compensation will be payable for the 
carbon permits rendered “useless” by the repeal of the trading scheme. The Clean Energy Act notes that 
these permits are “personal property” and that compensation on “just terms” would apply if the operation 
of the Act or regulations resulted in the acquisition of property.157  However, this in itself does not mean 
that these units are truly “personal property” nor that compensation will be payable in these 
circumstances. Complications have emerged in the context of tradable water entitlements where the High 
Court of Australia has held that reductions in the water allocations of members of the agricultural industry 
did not amount to an acquisition of property as the tradeable licences were no more than a “species of 
property” granting an entitlement to access a common resource; and it was not an acquisition as there was 
                                                            
152 Stern N, ‘The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review’ (Cabinet Office, HM Treasury 2006), p xviii. 
153 Hunt Greg, “How to Repeal the Carbon Tax” (The Australian, 25 October 2011). 
154 Note: only half the positions in the Senate will be included in the 2013 election. Kirk Alexandra “Opposition 
‘dreaming’ on carbon tax repeal: Combet” (PM with Mark Colvin, 17 October 2011) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2011/s3341652.htm> viewed 10 January 2012. 
155 The legislation would have to be twice passed by the House of Representatives and twice rejected by the Senate 
leading to the call of an early election under section 57 of the Australian Commonwealth Constitution. 
156 Hunt, n153. 
157 Clean Energy Act, s 308. 
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no benefit or advantage to the State from limiting access to that common resource.158 Whether 
compensation will payable for the cancellation of the carbon permits will therefore depend on whether the 
High Court of Australia characterises these permits as personal property and determines that the outright 
repeal of the scheme (rather than the direct cancellation or acquisition of permits) is sufficient to trigger 
the compensation requirements under the Australian Constitution. In the meantime, Australian businesses 
are faced with a dilemma of whether to embrace the new carbon price, and begin making the necessary 
business planning and investment decisions, or assume that it will be merely a temporary legal measure.   
                                                            
158 ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v the Commonwealth [2009] HCA 51.  
